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IMPOSING PUNITIVE DAMAGE LIABILITY ON THE
INTOXICATED DRIVER
by
MARTIN A. KOTLER'
I. INTRODUCTION
DRIVING WHILE UNDER the influence of intoxicants is, without question, a
universally condemned practice. The spokesmen for the "if you drink, don't
drive" message include not only such anti-drunk driving advocates as the
Mothers against Drunk Driving (MADD), Students against Drunk Driving
(SADD), and the Physicians against Drunk Driving (PADD),' but also the
makers of Seagrams and Bacardi liquors and the liquor industry association,
Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S. (DISCUS).'
The reasons for the unanimity are obvious. Study after study, has
established a direct correlation between driving while intoxicated and the oc-
currence of traffic accidents with their resultant property damage, personal in-
jury and death to both the drinking driver and others.'
In response to this problem, various solutions have been proposed and im-
plemented. Most commonly, these solutions involve modification of law en-
forcement techniques in order to facilitate the apprehension of drinking
drivers, increasingly severe criminal sanctions imposed against those who have
been convicted, and public education programs.' In addition, however, a grow-
ing number of courts are permitting the recovery of punitive or exemplary
damages in civil actions brought against the intoxicated driver. It is this expan-
sion of civil liability with which this article deals.
*LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1984: J.D., University of California, Hastings College of
Law, 1975; B.A. The George Washington University, 1972. Admitted to State Bar of California, 1975;
presently completing course work required to obtain J.S.D. at New York University. The author wishes to
express his gratitude to Professor William E. Nelson of the New York University School of Law for having
taken the time to read and offer valuable suggestions regarding the revision of earlier drafts of this article.
'For a partial listing of anti-drunk driving organizations, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1983, at A 12. See also.
How to Save Lives and Reduce Injuries: A Citizen's Guide to Effectively Fight Drunk Driving. DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. APPENDIX A (Nov.
1982).
2Gay Jervey, Spirit Marketers Get Word: 'Tis the Time for Caution. Advertising Age, December 26, 1983, at
3.
'See. e.g. Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. Final Report (Nov. 1983); Alcohol and Highway Safe-
ty: A Review of the State of Knowledge - Summary Volume. Department of Transportation. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1978).
'N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1984, at A 17; See also Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. Final Report (Nov.
1983) whose recommendations include: programs to increase public awareness of both the danger of injury
and apprehension; increased training of police and prosecutors; use of roadblocks; elimination of plea
bargaining; mandatory sentencing; and so on.
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It is important to keep in mind throughout this discussion that awareness
and acknowledgement of the existence of a problem, even a very serious prob-
lem, should not make us overreact and thereby accept an unworkable solution
in our zeal to do something. The imposition of punitive damages is, for the
most part, just such an unworkable solution. More specifically, I will attempt
to demonstrate that, with the possible exception of the case of the recidivist,
non-alcoholic defendant, the imposition of punitive damages simply cannot be
justified. That being the case, we must look elsewhere for a solution to an ad-
mittedly severe problem.
Section I1 will analyze the case law pertaining to the imposition of pu-
nitive damages for unintentional torts generally and for drunk driving spe-
cifically. Section III will discuss the various rationales commonly asserted for
the imposition of punitive damages. Section VI will examine some of the major
objections to and problems created by the imposition of punitive damage
liability against the intoxicated driver, and section V will propose a standard.
11. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASES
Anyone who attempts to read or analyze the cases involving the imposi-
tion of punitive damages in the unintentional conduct cases will immediately
realize that little understanding is to be gained by focusing on the court's
description of the defendant's conduct itself. Undeniably, there exists a class of
conduct that is too extreme to be simply called negligence, but which, because
of the tortfeasor's state of mind, does not rise to the level of intent required to
establish assault or battery. Such conduct has, at various times, by various
judicial bodies, been called wanton, reckless, willful, wrongful, unlawful, gross-
ly negligent, outrageous, culpable, heedless, distinctly antisocial, showing a
conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests of others, and justification
for the belief of reckless indifference to the welfare of others, and so on.'
Frequently, judges seem to despair of finding any single descriptive word
or phrase and attempt to string the adjectives together in order to adequately
articulate a standard and express their outrage, e.g. "wanton, reckless, and
grossly negligent,"6 or "gross, wilful, and wanton negligence" satisfying the
'See. e.g. Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 11929) ("gross, wanton and culpable"); Miller v. Blanton, 213
Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (19481 ("distinctly antisocial"): Hall v. Young, 218 Ark. 348, 236 S.W.2d 431
11951) ("gross negligence"): Vogler v. O'Neal, 226 Ark. 1007, 295 S.W.2d 629 (1956) ("reckless and
wanton"); Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App.2d 517,322 P.2d 933 11958) (holding that allegations that the
defendant's conduct was wilful, wrongful, reckless, and unlawful, did not charge malice, express or implied);
Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (disapproved Gombos v.
Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958), and held that a "conscious and deliberate disregard of the
interests of others may be called wilful or wanton."): Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306
11973) I"morally culpable"): Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa.Super. 35 )1970) ("reckless indifference").
See also DOBBS. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 205 (1973) (noting that "lall of these words refer to
the same underlying state of mind.. . .":) Note, The Drunken Driver and Punitive Damages: A Survey of the
Case Law and the Feasibility of a Punitive Damage Award in North Dakota, 59 N.D.L. REV. 413, 419
(1983 (noting the variety of terms used). See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
'Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 103, 66 N.W.2d 841, 846 11954).
[Vol. 18:2
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"morally culpable" test.7
Occasionally, a court will attempt to assign some rank to the different ad-
jectives. Thus, in Hinson v. Dawson' the court explained that "'reckless' and
'heedless' would seem to import an uncertain degree of negligence somewhat
short of "wantonness." Thus, while reckless conduct would not justify the
award of punitive damages, wanton conduct would if, that is, the wantonness
involved conduct which was "in conscious and intentional disregard of and in-
difference to the rights and safety of others."9
The other attempted distinction often utilized is that between malice in
fact and malice in law.' The former includes those cases where the defendant's
conduct is such that the trier of fact may infer that he actually harbored feel-
ings of spite or ill will toward the plaintiff" or at least toward someone. 2 The
latter cases are those where the defendant engaged in the type of behavior to
which we just referred, i.e., extremes of behavior which will almost inevitably
injure someone, probably sooner than later.'3
Utilizing the wide variation of language employed by the courts will ap-
parently lead to no clarification. Therefore, for our purposes here, it is suffi-
cient to characterize conduct as "negligent," "extreme," or "intentional.""
Negligence is a concept with which all legally trained persons are suffi-
ciently familiar to obviate the need for further definition.'5 "Intentional" as
used here refers to the state of mind where there is an actual subjective intent
7Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 22, 25, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309-10 (1973).
'244 N.C. 23, 28. 92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956).
'id. at 28, 92 S.E.2d at 397. See also Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C.App. 327. 329, 174 S.E.2d 74. 76 (1970). in
which the North Carolina appellate court interpreted Hinson as allowing punitive damages in cases of wan-
ton conduct, but said that "wantonness connotes intentional wrongdoing."
'uSee generally. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 250 (1975).
"See Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing and Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288, 38 P. 903, 904 (1894) de-
fining malice in fact as "a spiteful or rancorous disposition which causes an act to be done for mischief."
2See. e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S.W. 976 (1913) (defendant's conductor
assaulted plaintiffs father and in the course of the assault pushed him against the plaintiff. Under such cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff could recover punitive damages.)
"See Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing and Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288, 38 P. 903, 90411894), de-
fining malice in law as "a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." But see Seimon v.
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791-92 (1977) for the proposi-
tion that defendant's conduct was such to permit the jury to find that "defendant displayed a conscious and
callous indifference to, or disregard of probable harm to motorists..." and that such "conscious disregard"
was an "appropriate description of the animus malus requisite to an award of punitive damages." That is,
"extreme conduct" is considered malice in fact rather than malice in law.
"See also, Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 34-37 (1982)
noting that "Terms such as 'wilful,' 'wanton,' 'conscious indifference,' 'reckless disregard,' and 'recklessness'
are overlapping and to a substantial extent redundant. Accordingly, they will be referred to collectively as
the recklessness group." Compare Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver. 8 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 117, 126 (1980) Ihereinafter cited as Commentl that asserts that "While jurisdictions differ in their pref-
erence for these descriptive words and the burden of proof attached to each, it is generally agreed that the
defendant's actions must fall somewhere among these adjectives before a question of punitive damages may
be submitted to a jury."
"See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. § 908, comment b (1979).
Fall, 19841
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to injure.' 6 "Extreme" will refer to that fuzzy middle area.
When one attempts to classify driving while intoxicated, problems arise.
Generally, the defendant intended to drink (though not necessarily to excess)
and intended to drive. The chances are, however, that he at no point intended
to cause injury to anything or anyone. When he does cause injury, should the
courts classify his conduct as negligent, extreme, or intentional?
It is submitted that the question cannot be answered without both exam-
ining the drinking behavior and the driving behavior. If the defendant is, for
example, an alcoholic and has an inability or difficulty in controlling his drink-
ing behavior, this fact bears directly on the degree of culpability to be assigned.
If, on the other hand, the defendant has voluntarily consumed the intoxicant
but the consumption did not result in any extreme driving behavior, it seems to
be questionable policy to treat his behavior as anything more than negligence.
The characterization of the defendant's behavior is, of course, crucial to
courts in determining whether it is of a sufficiently culpable quality to justify
the imposition of punitive damages.
There is a distinct split in judicial opinion as to the availability of punitive
damages in the drunk driving case. 7 First, let us consider those decisions which
refuse to impose punitive damages. The approaches taken by the courts fall in-
to essentially three categories. First, there are those cases where the intox-
icated defendant's driving is not sufficiently extreme to distinguish it from that
of any other negligent driver. In Baker v. Marcus," for example, the parties
were involved in a typical low speed, rear end collision. There was no question
that the accident was caused by the defendant's inattention. Furthermore, the
"See. e.g. Friedman v. Jordan 166 Va. 65, 184 S.E. 186 (1936) (Plaintiff and defendant had been having a
disagreement over the existence of a debt. The defendant saw the plaintiff ride past on a bicycle. Defendant
chased plaintiff in his car and, after running him over, went through his pockets looking for money. The
court held punitive damages were appropriate.)
"A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have permitted the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. See. e.g. Fritz v. Salva, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala. 1981); Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929): Miller
v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d. 293 (1948); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854,
157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151
Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964); Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Busser v. Saba-
tasso, 143 So.2d 532 (Fla. App. 1962): Chitwood v. Stoner, 60 Ga.App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (1939): Madison v.
Wigel. 18 IlI.App.2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954);
Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 (1920); Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210
Miss. 836, 50 So.2d 572 (1951); Smith v. Sayles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App 1982); Allers v. Willis, 197
Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592 (1982); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (19711; Colligan v. Fera,
76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Payne v. Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (1977); Dorn v.
Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 458 P.2d 942 (1969); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Pratt
v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Higginbotham v. O'Keefe, 340 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960).
Several jurisdictions have, however, declined to permit the imposition of punitive damages. See Gesslein
v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954); Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (applying
Maryland law); Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74 (1970); Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247
P.2d 964 (1952); Eubank v. Spencer, 203 Va. 923, 128 S.E.2d 299 (1962).
"1201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960).
[Vol. 18:2
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evidence showed that the defendant had been drinking. t9 The court, on these
facts, declined to permit the imposition of punitive damages. It acknowledged
that "[o]ne who knowingly drives his automobile on the highway under the in-
fluence of intoxicants ... is, of course, negligent ... ." and further acknowl-
edged that evidence of intoxication was admissible to prove this negligence.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that absent "... proof of one or more of the
elements necessary to justify an award of punitive damages, [evidence of intox-
ication] may not be used to enlarge an award of damages beyond that which
will fairly compensate the plaintiff. .. "I' What the Baker court has done is to
focus on the defendant's physical conduct, rather than on her state of mind.
Second, there are cases that, while also refusing to impose punitive
damages, reach this result by focusing on the defendant's state of mind. They
conclude that an intoxicated driver's state of mind is not sufficiently culpable
to justify the imposition of punitive damages. Thus, for example, prior to 1979,
California took the position that driving while intoxicated was not a malicious
act and, therefore, the conduct involved was not sufficient to support a cause
of action for punitive damages. In Gombos v. Ashe2' the court held that "[olne
who becomes intoxicated, knowing that he intends to drive his automobile on
the highway, is of course negligent, and perhaps grossly negligent. It is a
reckless and wrongful and illegal thing to do. But it is not a malicious act."22
Underlying the courts' decisions in both Baker and Gombos seems to be
what is essentially a fairness/unjust enrichment notion. That is, in Baker, it
would have been unfair to treat the defendant any differently than hundreds of
other momentarily inattentive drivers and, at the same time, it would be inap-
propriate to permit the plaintiff to recover more than fair compensation for her
injuries. This argument is somewhat less plausible in a case decided on a Gom-
bos type rationale given the fact that by focusing on state of mind, greater ex-
tremes of driving behavior may be encompassed. Nevertheless, there is still a
sense that it would be unfair to punish the defendant absent a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. This idea is coupled with the notion that the defendant
should not be rewarded, but only compensated.
The third category of cases denying punitive damages include those where
the courts focus on the policies underlying the award of punitive damages,
"Id. at 907, 114 S.E.2d at 619. The Baker court explained that the defendant "testified that an hour before
the accident... she had taken two drinks of vodka .... [Tlhe police, after a conference with respect to her
intoxication, [had come] to the conclusion that it seemed to be a 'borderline case' and they charged her in a
warrant with reckless driving only." Id.
When cases are presented where the defendant is inattentive or otherwise careless and also intoxicated,
we frequently make the understandable but unjustifiable assumption that the intoxication was the "cause"
of the inattention. Since we know that alcohol and certain other drugs impair judgment, slow reaction speed,
etc., the assumption appears to be "proved." However, inasmuch as we know that inattention or carelessness
while driving occurs frequently in the absence of alcohol use, all we can really say is that it can be dem-
onstrated that statistically there is a higher probability that carelessness will occur if there has been alcohol
use. In a particular case of garden variety carelessness, true causation is generally unprovable.
"Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621.
2'158 Cal.App.2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
'id. at 527, 322 P.2d at 940.
Fall, 19841
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rather than on the particular quality of the defendant's act or state of mind.
When a court's analysis leads to the conclusion that the purported purposes of
punitive damages would not be achieved, the damages are not allowed. This
category includes both the cases where punitive damages are not permitted in
the unintentional conduct cases as well as the cases where punitive damages
are not permitted under any circumstances.
Thus, for example, in Davis v. Gordon23 a Maryland court held that "Itihe
rules of the road are far more effective than any inflammatory verdicts in mak-
ing our streets and highways safe for travel. The fear of arrest is more of a
deterrent than a verdict in a civil case for damages."2 Additionally, the judicial
decisions of at least three states do not recognize the availability of punitive
damages even for intentional conduct.25
The decisions which permit the imposition of punitive damages fall into
one of two categories.26 Some courts permit the imposition of punitive damages
in a Baker type case. That is, evidence of intoxication is, by itself, sufficient to
justify the award. In Taylor v. Superior Court," for example, the plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the defendant Stille was "an alcoholic" with a "history"
of driving while under the influence and that he was "aware of the
dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated." 8
The Complaint further alleged that Stille had previously caused a serious
automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he
had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior
occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, Stille had recently com-
pleted a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction;
23183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
2"Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
"These states are New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Washington. See, Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872);
Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d 66 (1972); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230
N.W.2d 472 (1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash. 2d 23,436 P.2d 186 (1968). New Hampshire
and Washington permit penalty damages where expressly provided for by statute (see, e.g. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 265:89-a (1982) permitting double damages against the recidivist drunk driver); Nebraska has held
such statutory provisions to violate due process under the state constitution. See Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb.
926, 932, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689-90 (1960).
Connecticut limits punitive damages to the amount of actual litigation expenses minus taxable costs. See
Triangle Sheet Metal Works Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 222 A.2d 220 (1966). Massachusetts limits
recovery of punitive damages to cases where expressly authorized by statute. See Boott Mills v. Boston &
Me. R.R. Co, 218 Mass. 582, 589, 106 N.E. 680, 683-84 (1914).
"6For a similar analysis of the cases imposing punitive damages see Note, The Drunken Driver and Punitive
Damages: A Survey of the Case Law and the Feasibility of a Punitive Damage Award in North Dakota,
supra, note 5, at 422. See also cases collected at Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 658.
"24 Cal.3d 890, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979).
"Id. at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 695.
[Vol. 18:2
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that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for
at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the
time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional
drunk driving charge. 9
Given these allegations, the court could have simply held that the plain-
tiffs complaint alleged facts which would, in sum, justify the award of punitive
damages if proven at trial. The court did not so rule, however, choosing instead
to allow a cause of action to be stated for punitive damages whenever a defen-
dant who is under the influence of intoxicants causes an accident. 0
The second group of cases which allow punitive damages are those where
the focus is not solely on the issue of intoxication. These decisions view intox-
ication as one of the factors which can be considered in establishing sufficient-
ly culpable conduct to justify the award, but require the totality of evidence to
be sufficient to prove state of mind. For example, in Sebastian v. Wood 3 there
was no question that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident
giving rise to the litigation. However, the court considered this factor together
with the evidence that for nine miles prior to the accident the defendant had
been repeatedly crossing the center line and had narrowly avoided another ac-
cident before hitting the plaintiff head on."
In other words, these jurisdictions permit the imposition of punitive
damages upon a showing of some form of "extreme" conduct. Alcohol usage is
only one of the factors to be considered, and it is entirely possible that punitive
damages will be awarded even though the defendant was not intoxicated."
While there is clearly a distinction which can be made between the basis
for decision in the Taylor type of case, on one hand, and the Sebastian type of
case on the other, it should be noted that, as a practical matter the difference is
probably not terribly significant, at least at the trial level. While obviously
many factors can influence the jury's verdict, once it hears evidence of the
defendant's intoxication, it would be no easy task for trial counsel to convince
them that punitive damages would be inappropriate."'
29Id.
"Id. at 898, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 697. The court stated, "One who wilfully consumes alcoholic
beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle ... reasonably
may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard for the safety of others." Id.
'1246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954).
"11d. at 106, 66 N.W.2d 848.
"See, e.g. Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So.2d 77 (1954) (driving at sundown on a curving road at
speeds between 75 and 100 miles per hour supported an award of punitive damages); Miller v. Blanton, 213
Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293, Annot. 3 A.L.R.2d 203 (1948) (evidence of intoxication coupled with driving on
the wrong side of the road over a blind hill); Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 (1920)
(evidence of intoxication, but excessive speed alone would have justified a finding of extreme misconduct
and hence punitive damages); See cases collected at Annot., 62 A.L.R. 2d 813.
'See infra p. 45 for a discussion of the prejudicial effect of evidence of intoxication.
PUNITIVE DAMAGESFail, 19841
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Thus, it should be clear that several questions must be addressed. At the
threshold is the question of whether or not the imposition of punitive damages
serves any function when considered in the context of the case of the intox-
icated driver. Assuming that there is some purpose to be served, should courts
be willing to allow punitive damages simply upon proof of the defendant's
voluntary intoxication or should intoxication be simply one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether to classify the defendant's conduct as ex-
treme? The following sections will address these issues.
11I. POLICIES UNDERLYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
All writers seeking to analyze the circumstances under which punitive
damages may be awarded recognize at least three justifications for their im-
position. These are: retribution; general deterrence; and special deterrence. 5 In
addition, however, a number of lesser justifications or objectives have been
mentioned. These include awarding punitive damages as a means of preserving
the peace;" as a "bounty" offered to induce private law enforcement;" as a
means of compensating the injured party for damages for which he would be
otherwise uncompensated;38 and to pay the injured party's costs and attorney's
fees. 9 The three primary justifications merit serious consideration. The re-
mainder shall be disposed of somewhat summarily.
A. Some Weak Arguments
The preservation of the peace idea was one of the original bases for the
imposition of punitive damages in civil actions. For example, in Merest v.
Harvey,' Justice Heath observed:
I remember a case where the jury gave £ 500 damages for merely knock-
"See. e.g. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 205. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE, §§
2.01-2.13; C. MCCORMICK, Handbook of the LAW OF DAMAGES 275-77 (1935); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES 28-31 (1980); Ellis, supra note 14, at 3; Note, The Drunken Driver and Punitive Damages: A
Survey of the Case Law and Feasibility of a Punitive Damage A ward in North Dakota, supra note 5, at
413-17; Comment, supra note 14 at 123.
"See, REDDEN, supra note 35, at 33; ELLIS, supra note 14, at 3; and Comment, supra note 14, at 129.
"See. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 205 ("The punitive award is thus seen as a bounty, or as compensation as a
kind of 'private attorney general."'); MCCORMICK, supra note 35, at 277; GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note
35, at § 2.02; ELLIS, supra note 14, at 3; and Comment, supra note 14, at 129.
"See, DOBBS, supra note 5, at 205; MCCORMICK, supra note 35, at 276; REDDEN, supra note 35, at 28; Ellis,
supra note 14, at 3; and Comment, supra note 14, at 123.
3'See, GHIARDI AND KIRCHER, supra note 35, at § 2. I 1; MCCORMICK, supra note 35, at 277; REDDEN, supra
note 35, at 33; Ellis, supra note 14, at 3; and Comment, supra note 14, at 129-30.
For authority utilizing essentially the same classifications as will be used here, see Ellis, supra, note 14, at
3. There is a substantial overlap within the categories mentioned above. For example, Professor Redden
writes of the "revenge" justification, but also notes that permitting the victim to seek revenge would go to
"prevent duelling." Thus, the "retribution" category would overlap to include both punishment and preser-
vation of the peace. See, REDDEN, supra, note 35, at 31. Similarly, Professor McCormick refers to punitive
damages as a means of giving the jurors a way to vent their indignation over the defendant's conduct. Such a
reason involves both retribution and preservation of the peace.
15 Taunt. 442, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814).
[Vol. 18:2
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ing a man's hat off; and the Court refused a new trial. There was not one
country gentleman in a hundred, who would have behaved with a
laudable and dignified coolness which this Plaintiff did. It goes to prevent
the practice of duelling if juries are permitted to punish insults by ex-
emplary damages."
Although it seems unlikely that the peace keeping idea would be terribly
effective today even in the intentional tort case, its present application in
drunk driving cases seems even less credible. Thus, if a person strikes another
in the face with a glove (saying whatever people say under such circumstances)
we may want to claim that the battered person is less likely to challenge the
other to a duel if he has the alternate remedy of suing for punitive damages. If,
however, one gets drunk and dents another's fender, the idea of a duel in lieu
of punitive damages is ludicrous.
The idea of private law enforcement, at least in the context of the intox-
icated driver," is somewhat more troublesome. It begins with the questionable
assumption that prosecutors are exercising discretion so as to not prosecute
drunk drivers in "minor" accident cases. The argument then continues:
Punitive damages.., provide a would-be plaintiff with far more incentive
to bring suit in the minor case, such as where a collision occurs involving
only slight property damage. An innocuous result, such as a bent fender,
does not and should not immunize the drunken driver from being pun-
ished for his wrongful conduct."3
This argument presents a number of problems. First, it is necessary to
consider why the prosecutor has chosen not to prosecute. If he feels that he has
a weak case (perhaps a marginal blood alcohol level) and cannot prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, do we really want to punish this individual?"
Inherent in the foregoing is the issue of the appropriate standard of
burden of proof needed to obtain "quasi-criminal" punitive damages in the civil
action. Something of an anomaly is presented in this regard. Although some at-
torneys have argued that the trier of fact should not be able to find the req-
uisite state of mind based on a mere preponderance, courts have generally re-
'Id. at 444, 128 Eng. Rep. at 761.
'4The private law enforcement claim is arguably somewhat more plausible in other contexts. See. e.g..
DOBBS, supra note 35, at 221. Professor Dobbs supports the "bounty" concept in the case of non-violent
serious crimes such as treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 for anti-trust violations. See also MCCORMICK,
supra note 35, at 276. Professor McCormick argued that "... . the principal advantage [of punitive damagesi
is that [they] bring punishment to a type of case of oppressive conduct . . . which are theoretically
punishable, but which in actual practice go unnoticed by prosecutors occupied with more serious crimes."
MCCORMICK, supra note 35, at 276. Driving while intoxicated is, of course, routinely prosecuted and,
therefore the argument is not applicable in this context.
'
3Comment, supra, note 14, at 129.
"See, e.g., Baker v. Marcus: See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
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jected such arguments."5
The second possibility is that the prosecutor has chosen not to prosecute
because his resources are limited, and other cases are judged to be more press-
ing. The problem with the private law enforcement argument is that it
overlooks the fact that our prosecutor's problem of too many cases and not
enough judges is really a sign of the times and is not restricted to the criminal
courts.4" Given the increase in the number of civil law suits filed with resulting
overcrowded calendars, do we really want to encourage civil litigation over
"innocuous results?" 7
The "compensation for the otherwise uncompensated" argument must
also fail. This argument refers to the idea that the law may not recognize cer-
tain interests as being compensable. To remedy this, punative damages are
awarded instead. Actually, these are not "punitive damages" at all, but rather
mislabeled compensatory damages. For example, in Loeblich v. Garnier"8 the
jury had awarded a small amount of punitive damages for "mental anguish,
humiliation, and embarrassment" which results from a trespass to land, not-
withstanding the fact that at the time the case was argued, the applicable law
was thought to limit recovery in that type of case to actual property loss
resulting from the trespass. 9
There does not appear to be any support among the commentators for this
particular justification of punitive damage liability."0 Obviously, if compen-
satory damages are inadequate, then our attention should be focused on a revi-
sion of the law of compensatory damages. Otherwise, we would face the
anomaly of two plaintiffs with identical injuries only one of whom is fully com-
pensated because of his "good" fortune that the defendant was drunk. The en-
tire discussion here is premised on the idea that, to the extent that compen-
satory damages can do so, the plaintiff has been made whole. If additional pay-
ment is to be made it must necessarily have some legitimate function other
than compensation to justify its existence.
The foregoing argument encompasses the "compensation for costs and at-
'See, Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal.3d 278, 291, 562 P.2d 316, 323-24, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 642-43 (1977) rejecting
even a "clear and convincing evidence" compromise between the "beyond a reasonable doubt" and
"preponderance of the evidence" disparity. But see, Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 504, 616 P.2d 127, 129
(1980) holding that under the applicable Colorado statute ... plaintiff must establish a claim for punitive
damages beyond a reasonable doubt."
'See generally Ryan, Lipetz, Luskin and Neubauer, Analyzing Court Delay - Reduction Programs: Why
do some Succeed, 65 JUDICATURE 58 (Aug. 1981).
"The matter is even worse than indicated. It must be noted that in all probability, because of the greater
number of issues presented, it will take significantly longer to try the civil punitive damage case than the
criminal drunk driving case arising out of the same fender bender.
81113 So.2d 95 (La. App. 1959).
"Id. at 102.
"See, e.g. DOBBS, supra note 35, at 205 (noting that this is not a punitive damage theory at all); MCCORMICK,
supra note 35 at 276 (suggesting "... . it is basically unsound to award this amount which the defendant is
condemned to pay as punishment to the plaintiff who has already been made whole by the actual
damages."); Ellis, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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torney's fees" argument as well."' Costs and attorney's fees are recoverable
where authorized by appropriate legislation. If they are to be recoverable, suit-
able legislation would be easy enough to draft. However, there is no logical rea-
son why availability should be dependent upon the inebriation of the defen-
dant.
B. Retribution
The retributive theory, in its purest form, has been stated as follows:
It is an end-in-itself that the guilty should suffer pain . . . The primary
justification of punishment is always to be found in the fact that an of-
fense has been committed which deserves punishment, not in any future
advantage to be gained by its infliction whether for society or for the of-
fender as an individual."
Inherent in such a formulation is the notion that it is morally appropriate
that one who does wrong should receive punishment. Additionally, this
punishment should be directly proportional to the offense itself.53 While courts
in punitive damage cases frequently speak in terms of "retribution," even a
casual reading of the cases makes it clear that they are not truly speaking of
retributive theory."' When mentioned at all, the retribution theory is discussed
in terms of "deterrence.""
It is important to note that in actual practice the imposition of punitive
damages does not fit into the retributive theory's formulation. That is to say,
punitive damages do not satisfy the requirements of the definition of retribu-
tion. The most obvious failure in this regard is in the measurement of the dam-
ages themselves. As noted, the retribution theory requires that the amount of
punishment be a function of the nature and degree of the culpability of the de-
fendant's acts. In the case of punitive damages, although the quality of the act
determines the applicability of the punishment, the amount is in practice a
function of the defendant's wealth rather than a function of the degree of
"See, GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 35, at § 2.12 ("if the present system of awarding costs to the suc-
cessful party in civil litigation is to be faulted because the amount awarded is grossly inadequate, it would ap-
pear much more proper to attack the problem directly."); DOBBS, supra note 5, at 221 (noting that the "im-
petus for punitive damages would diminish were a new and effective scheme to be adopted for the financing
of reasonable litigation.").
"A. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 13 (1929).
"Id. at 14-15.
'See, however, Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Com-
ment 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133, 143-44 (1982), where the author concludes:
The deterrence theory... badly fails the descriptive test: there is almost nothing in the common law
of punitive damages that it clarifies, and there are central features in the law that it contradicts. I
therefore propose that we be willing to take 'punitive' damages at face value - that is, as primarily
designed to punish.
"See. e.g., Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Heart, 262 N.Y. 320, 324-25, 186 N.E. 798,
800 (1933) in which the court stated:
Who so disturbs a dead body merely to suit his own convenience does so at his own risk. He may do a
wrong for which he should be punished. He knows what he is doing. If he is wilful and malicious in
his wrongdoing he should be punished to deter others from acting likewise.
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culpability. 6
Furthermore, even if we accept retribution as a desirable or at least per-
missible function of the legal system, the retribution rationale raises at least
one major policy question and a host of related problems. The major policy
question was alluded to in connection with the "private enforcement" argu-
ment. Should punishment for conduct which is in all jurisdictions a criminal
offense be left to the criminal courts? Only a few courts have taken this view.
In Giddings v. Zellan" the court applied the law of Maryland in reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff. In so doing, it observed that the existing Maryland
statute made it a criminal offense to drive while under the influence and con-
cluded that the criminal law was a more appropriate sanction. 8
The writers who have considered the question have generally done so on
two bases. The first is whether the conduct which forms the justification for
the punitive damage award is in fact routinely punished by the criminal justice
system (as opposed to conduct which though technically a crime is rarely pros-
ecuted). 9 The second involves an objection to the apparent existence of a dou-
ble jeopardy problem. Thus, for example, one writer concluded
Although it seems unjustifiable to permit punitive damages to supplement
criminal punishment where the criminal law in fact operates to regulate
the undesirable conduct, punitive damages seem to be a useful substitute
for criminal law in areas where criminal punishment is inappropriate. In
some cases the utility of punitive damages appears to require their imposi-
tion while the principles of double jeopardy appear to forbid their imposi-
tion. It is difficult to reconcile the demands of utility with the traditional
guarantees of double jeopardy. 6°
The double jeopardy problem is one which has disturbed writers much
more than it has disturbed the courts. Most courts that have considered the
issue have disposed of the problem by finding that the word "jeopardy" applied
only to cases that were purely criminal prosecutions." Thus recovery of
punitive damages is not precluded by the fact that the defendant has been or
may be criminally punished for the same misconduct. 2
"See infra pp. 46-47 for a discussion of prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of wealth.
"160 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759 (1947).
"See Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944). See supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
"See supra note 42.
'Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1158, 1184 (1966).
"See, e.g. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 813, 174 CaI.Rptr. 348, 383 (1981) stating,
"The argument that [punitive damage liabilityl ... violates the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy is ... fallacious. This prohibition is applicable only to criminal prosecutions."
"See Shelley v. Clark, 267 Ala. 621, 103 So.2d 743 (1958); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293
(1948); Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54 (1852); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 23 Colo. 113, 47 P. 284 (1896); Jef-
ferson v. Adams, 4 Del. 321 (1845); King v. Nixon, 207 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla.
117 (1882); Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 71 N.W. 223 (1897); Wiley v. Man-A-to-wah, 6 Kan. I I I
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The minority view was expressed by the court in Fay v. Parker:"63
If exemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages are ever recoverable, we are
clearly of the opinion that they cannot be recovered in an action for an in-
jury which is also punishable by indictment, as libel and assault and bat-
tery. If they could, the defendant might be punished twice for the same
act. (citations) ... In very corrupt or flagitious wrongs, if a criminal pros-
ecution lies for the public offense, I do not see much justification for what
are called vindictive damages there, or smart money in a civil suit, as the
criminal one covers them."
Finally, a rather curious view seems to have prevailed in Indiana. Initial-
ly, the court adopted the view "that a provision of the statute allowing ex-
emplary damages ... violates a fundamental principle embodied in the Bill of
Rights that no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense."65
Thereafter, various exceptions were carved out of this rule. As things currently
stand punitive damages are allowed in a civil action provided that the statute
of limitations has run as to any criminal prosecution arising out of the same
conduct." Additionally, a corporation can be held for punitive damages since it
cannot be criminally prosecuted for acts of its agents. 67 Finally, "conduct in-
dicating a heedless disregard of the consequences will support an award of
punitive damages. '6 It would thus appear that if the defendant intentionally
runs someone down with his automobile and is criminally prosecuted, the vic-
tim cannot recover punitive damages. If, however, the injury is caused by con-
duct amounting to Indiana's variation of "extreme" conduct (which is short of
intentional conduct), punitive damages are available 9.6
A closely related problem is whether the trier of fact in the civil case may
consider the fact that the defendant had been previously criminally punished
(1870); Doerhoefer v. Shewmaker, 123 Ky. 646, 97 S.W. 7 (1906); Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553 (1875);
Elliot v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49 (1875); Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 7 N.W. 263 (1880); Wagner v.
Gibbs, 80 Miss. 53, 31 So. 434 (1902); Corwin v. Walton, 18 Mo. 71 (1853); Blackmore v. Ellis, 70 N.J.L.
264, 57 A. 1047 (1904); Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 466 (1844); Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E.
610 (1911); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 (1859); Roshak v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275 (1977);
Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 A. 906 (1908); Rowe v. Moses, 43 S.C.L. 423 (1856); Flanagan v. Womack,
54 Tex. 45 (1880); Gray v. Janicki, 118 Vt. 49, 99 A.2d 707 (1953); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
353 N.H. 342 (1872).
"Id. at 372.
6"Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877).
'Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353, 220 N.E.2d 665 (1966); True Temper Corp. v. Moore, 157 Ind.App.
142, 299 N.E.2d 844 (1973).
"Indiana Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind.App. 268, 113 N.E. 1019 (1916); Baltimore & O.S.W.R. Co. v.
Davis, 44 Ind.App. 375, 89 N.E. 403 (1909).
"Nicholson's Mobile Homes Sales Inc. v. Schramm, 164 lnd.App. 598, 606, 330 N.E.2d 785, 791. See also
True Temper Corp. v. Moore, 157 Ind. App. 142, 299 N.E.2d 844 (1973), Capital Dodge Inc. v. Haley, 154
Ind.App. I, 288 N.E.2d 766 (1972).
"See Thompson v. Pickle, 136 Ind.App. 139, 145, 191 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1963) holding that intoxication, ex-
cessive speed and erratic driving supported a finding of wanton misconduct. The court did not, however,
consider a punitive damage issue.
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as mitigation. Generally, the answer is that they cannot." However, there is a
contrary but minority view. Thus in Browand v. Scott Lumber Co.7 the court
stated:
Since evidence of a defendant's wealth is admissible to enable the jury to
determine what amount of punishment should be imposed ... it would ap-
pear equally proper to consider, as obviously the jury here did, what other
punishment the defendant McFairen had received for the same act and in
the exercise of its discretion to conclude that his conviction and fine in the
justice's court was sufficient punishment for him ... 1
One other factor which must be taken into consideration is the effect of
double punishment on the efficient administration of the judicial system.
Arguably, the availability of punitive damages for drunk driving may have cer-
tain undesirable effects on the goal of efficient administration of the criminal
law by requiring more "driving while intoxicated" cases to be tried rather than
be disposed of pleas. Assume that an individual is facing charges of driving
while intoxicated as the result of an injury accident. Can his counsel advise
him to enter a guilty plea? If the jurisdiction allows punitive damages the
answer is probably no. The guilty plea would certainly be an admission which
could be used in the subsequent civil proceeding.73 If the driving under the in-
fluence offense is charged as a misdemeanor, many courts would hold a con-
viction not admissible in the subsequent civil matter.7"
The obvious solution to this problem is to enter a plea of nolo contendere
(assuming no good defense) which would not be an admission. In fact, this is
the very reason for the existence of the nolo plea.75 However, a no contest plea
is not open to the accused in all jurisdictions.76 Even in those jurisdictions
"°See Irby v. Wilde, 155 Ala. 388, 46 So. 454 (1908) (defendant not entitled to introduce criminal judgment of
conviction in civil case as mitigation); Redden v. Gates, 52 Iowa 210, 2 N.W. 1079 (1879) (no error for refus-
ing to instruct the jury that a fine could be considered in mitigation); Gray v. Janicki, 118 Vt. 49, 99 A.2d
709 (1953) (criminal fine immaterial on question of punitive damages).
1'125 Cal.App. 2d 68, 269 P.2d 891 (1954).
721d. at 74-75, 269 P.2d at 896. Accord, Sanders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
"
3See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 265,635-36 (2d ed. 1972). While it is
true that the same argument applies to compensatory damages, in those jurisdictions where a public policy
prohibits insuring against punitive damages the defendant's personal assets are exposed and therefore there
would be less inclination to plead guilty.
'See Bolen v. Buyze, 16 Mich.App. 252, 167 N.W.2d 808 (1969) (conviction for reckless driving held inad-
missible in civil personal injury action); Loughner v. Schmelzer, 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966) (convic-
tion for failure to drive on right side of the road held inadmissible in civil personal injury action even though
a felony conviction would be admissible). The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 521 provides for admissibility
of any judgment finding a person guilty of a crime or misdemeanor.
"See United States v. Pannell, 178 F.2d 98, 100 (3rd Cir. 1949) explaining that the no contest plea was re-
tained by the criminal procedure rules. FED. R. CRIM. P. II.
'Holding a nolo contendre plea not available to accused see May v. Lingo, 277 Ala. 92, 167 So.2d 267(1964); In Re Eaton, 14 lll.2d 388, 152 N.E.2d 850 (1958); Mahoney v. State, 197 Ind. 335, 149 N.E. 444
(1925); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948); State v. Keiwel, 166 Minn.
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which do recognize it, it is held not to be available to the accused in all criminal
prosecutions. It is allowable only on leave and acceptance by the court, and the
court has rather broad discretion in this regard." It must also be noted that
some courts will not accept a nolo plea in a mandatory imprisonment case"8
which is an increasingly more common punishment for driving while intox-
icated.79
In any event, for purposes of the discussion here it is not really necessary
to resolve the grand debate over the propriety of retribution as a function of
the legal system. Assuming that retribution is an acceptable goal, it seems self
evident that achievement of this goal should be left to the criminal law. To
allow punitive damages for the purpose of revenge in the civil action as well as
the criminal action is both conceptually redundant and practically inefficient.
C. Deterrence
What commonly comes under the general label "deterrence," is really two
separate concepts.8 The first concept involves preventing persons other than
the tortfeasor from committing similar offenses by holding the punished defen-
dant up to the general public as an example (general deterrence). The second
involves the idea of preventing the particular tortfeasor from repeating his tor-
tious conduct (special deterrence).
The deterrence rationale has an essentially utilitarian basis. The ex-
ponents of the utilitarian theory of punishment argue that punishment is evil
in itself and therefore is justified only if it serves to prevent some greater evil.
As a corollary to this argument is the idea that the proper amount of punish-
ment is the minimal amount which will achieve the socially useful goal.8
Thus, for example, as previously noted, the amount of punitive damages
which will be awarded in a particular case is generally directly proportional to
the defendant's wealth. The minimal amount of punishment necessary to
achieve the desired deterrence must necessarily be greater in the case of the
302, 207 N.W. 646 (1926); State v. Norman, 380 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. 1964); People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125,
191 N.E. 859 (1934); Laughlin v. Lamar, 205 Okla 372, 237 P.2d 1015 (1951).
"Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 139 P.2d 681 (1943); State v. Pometti, 12 N.J.
446, 97 A.2d 399 (1953); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d 77 (1956); Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264
Pa. 246, 107 A. 729 (1919); United States v. Faucette, 223 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 1963); United States v.
Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
"See, e.g., Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922); Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162
S.E. So. (1932); See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law. § 493 (1975).
"See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(a) (West Supp. 1984) (effective 1-1-82) (mandatory 96 hour imprison-
ment for first time offenders); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (3-16-83) (mandatory 72 hour imprison-
ment for first time offenders).
uSome writers also included the idea of preventing the victim or those acting on his behalf from seeking
vengeance or committing other similar acts which constitute a breach of the peace under the general label of
"deterrence." For example, see Ellis supra, note 14, at 8. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Ij. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823).
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rich defendant than in the case of the poor defendant.12
The notion that establishing a rule authorizing punitive damages in the
drunk driving case will deter persons other than the defendant from drinking
and driving is one of the most often repeated rationales and in some ways is
one of the most disturbing. Frequent repetition of the idea has, in some
quarters, raised it to the level of self evident truth, a position which one
suspects it simply does not deserve. Before attempting to point out the major
weakness in this rationale, it is instructive to examine a fairly typical example
of the judicial opinion following the "self evident truth" mold.
Opinions frequently begin with a recitation of the grim statistics and,
without explanation or apology, go on to conclude that punitive damages
should be recoverable. For example, in Taylor v. Superior Court,8" after noting
that "traffic accidents are the greatest cause of violent death in the United
States" and that "[olne third of the injuries and one half of the deaths are
alcohol related,"8 the court continued:
[Tihe fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so
many of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself
to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driv-
ing automobiles after drinking, including the exposure to awards of
punitive damages in the event of accidents. 5
The weakness here is that the argument itself assumes that the availability
of punitive damages is, in fact, a "means of deterring persons from driving
after drinking.. ." without ever attempting to prove the proposition. Many of
the writers who have taken the time to analyze the problem have concluded
that the deterrent effect is either nonexistent 6 or unprovable." The following
is an example of the "unprovable" claim:
There is simply no statistical method of ferreting out those who are de-
terred by criminal sanctions or punitive damages; this section of the
population is undetectable and therefore immeasurable. Since this large
but statistically elusive portion of the population is an indispensable factor
to any analysis attempting to determine the validity or invalidity of the
deterrent value of exemplary damages or penal laws, such an analysis is
necessarily incomplete. Consequently any conclusions drawn from that
partial analysis are conjectural. Both the doctrine's critics and supporters
argue that the other should prove either the viability or non-viability of
the doctrine's deterrent value. Whoever is forced to carry this burden of
2See infra pp. 46-47 for discussion of the prejudicial effect of offering evidence of the defendant's wealth.
'124 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693 (1979).
"Id. at 898, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
"Id. at 897. 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
"See, Schwartz, supra note 54, at 133; see also infra note 89.
"Comment, supra note 14, at 117.
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proof will fail."8
Note first that the foregoing assumes that there is, in fact, a "large... por-
tion of the population" which is deterred. Such a claim has not been estab-
lished. Furthermore, even if there is a potentially large group of persons who
might react as suggested, it does not foreclose the issue.
Any discussion of whether a specific sanction will deter one from a course
of conduct rests on the assumption that he who is to be deterred is aware of the
existence of the sanction. In other words, if the risk of punitive damages is ex-
pected to dissuade the general public from drinking and driving then it is to be
assumed that the general public knows what punitive damages are, and knows
that such a penalty can be imposed on them should they drink and drive.
While virtually everyone knows that driving under the influence is a criminal
offense, it is unlikely that, outside the members of the bench and bar, many
people know what punitive damages are, let alone whether they are available
in a civil suit resulting from damage caused by the intoxicated driver.89
The public's lack of awareness of the nature or availability of punitive
damages should not be confused with popular misconceptions regarding the
consequences of drinking, driving and causing an accident. That is to say, the
layman might well state that it is his belief that if he drinks and drives and
causes an accident the injured party will "sue him for every penny he has."
Loosely speaking, this may well be true if punitive damages are available.
However, the existence of the belief does not depend on the underlying reality.
Whatever deterrence there may be is a result of the mythology surrounding
lawsuits and would not be affected by unpublicized judicial opinion on the sub-
ject.
While the foregoing is not, of course, a valid objection to the theoretical
concept of punitive damages as a deterrent to the drinking driver, it would
seem to dispose of any claim that punitive damages have the practical effect of
reducing highway accidents and fatalities. That is, even if we assume arguendo
that the sanction of punitive damages can serve as a general deterrent, it is not
so serving at the present time.
uld. at 128-129 n. 66.
"See also REDDEN, supra note 35, at § 7.6(B), 628. The author concluded that the deterrence rationale:
Ills strictly a fiction. Few persons have any knowledge and understanding of what punitive damages
are, yet they are quite aware of criminal sanctions against acts for which they could also be held liable
in punitive damages.... The vague public policy of granting punitive damages because of a deterrent
effect is not supported by any empirical facts."
This lack of awareness among the general public is the key factor which distinguishes the arguable deter-
rent effect of punitive damages in the drunk driving case from the potential deterrent effect in, for example,
the products liability action. The class of persons whose conduct the law seeks to influence in the latter case
is more likely to possess the legal awareness or sophistication to realize that a knowing distribution of a de-
fective product may have enormous adverse economic consequences. Certainly, all major corporate manu-
facturers would have this awareness. In contrast, a few persons may realize that punitive damages are avail-
able in the drunk driving case, however, they would make up no more than a small fraction of the total class.
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The claim that punitive damages are an appropriate device to deter the re-
cidivist offender, however, bears close attention. While the general public is
unaware of the availability of punitive damages, the recidivist has by his con-
duct already enmeshed himself in the criminal or civil justice system. Under
such circumstances, it would not be difficult to advise him personally that he
risks subjecting himself to potentially severe economic consequences should he
drink and drive again."
There is, however, the specter of the alcoholic haunting the proceedings.
Would the compulsive drinker be deterred by the knowledge that punitive
damages would be available in the future? Most authorities hold the opinion
that he would not.
Alcoholism has been recognized as a disease which does on many occa-
sions, respond to knowledgeable treatment. It does not usually respond to
heavy fines, limited suspension of the license, financial responsibility reg-
ulations, jail terms, or platitudinous statements that "if you drink, don't
drive." We must develop mechanisms for identifying which drivers who
are convicted of drunk driving, or are involved in an accident, are social
drinkers who might respond to usual motivational techniques. And we
must know which ones have serious problems with alcohol and need si-
multaneous referral to the driver licensing agency for an open-ended rev-
ocation pending improvement and to other agencies for medical and so-
cial therapy.9
However, for the non-compulsive drinker, the option may well be viable if
not overwhelmed by conflicting considerations. That is, it would seem that
many of the objections to the concept of a general deterrent value of punitive
damages fail in this situation, at least if the defendant was advised at the time
of the first conviction or adverse judgment that punitive damages would
thereafter be available. Thus, imposition of punitive damages on this one
relatively small group may constitute an effective measure.
At least one writer has taken the position that the criminal law is a more effective sanction in this situation
also. See, Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1173-74 (1966). The author states:
No matter how mild the criminal sanction, the possibility of confinement or the stigma of a criminal
record are greater deterrents to wrongful conduct than the mere imposition of monetary sanctions.
Criminal penalties should constitute a sufficient general deterrent for wrongful conduct; moreover,
criminal law serves as a more effective special deterrent. The memory of the harsher penalty will be
more vivid. The violator will also know that his criminal record will affect his sentence in future
criminal actions.
However, one state legislature seems to have recognized that the recidivist may be an appropriate excep-
tion to a general rule against the imposition of punitive damages. In 1982, New Hampshire, one of the few
states that had refused to recognize punitive damages under any circumstances, enacted N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 265:89-a (1982). This section provides in part as follows
A defendant in a civil case arising from an accident which resulted in the defendant's conviction (of
driving while intoxicated], where such conviction was the second or subsequent conviction for that of-
fense in a 7 year period, shall be liable for double the amount of damages awarded.
Id.
"Waller, Alcohol Ingestion. Alcoholism and Traffic Accidents, The Legal Issues in Akcoholism and Alcohol
Usage. B.U.L.-MED. INsT. 79-80 (1965).
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IV. OTHER OBJECTIONS
The imposition of punitive damages, however, creates certain problems
even when their availability is limited to the case against the recidivist, non-
alcoholic offender. These problems can loosely be classified as those which af-
fect the arguable potential for effective deterrence and those which create
practical difficulties in providing the defendant with a fair trial. If the potential
for effective deterrence is lost, it is submitted that there is no justification
whatsoever for punitive damage liability against the drinking driver. Specifical-
ly, if the defendant can insure against the liability, abolition of this form of
liability is in order.
On the other hand, the existence of practical problems in ensuring a fair
trial does not necessarily mandate the abolition of punitive damage liability.
The nature and extent of these difficulties should, however, be weighed and
balanced against the utility of civil punishment.
A. Effect of Third Party Liability Insurance
There is a clear and fundamental split in the various jurisdictions on the
issue of whether a tortfeasor can insure against punitive damage liability.92
Preliminarily, it should be noted that insurers have two related but
distinct obligations to the insured under the standard automobile liability
policy. There is both a defense obligation and an indemnity obligation.
Generally speaking, there is no question that the insurer will defend the civil
drunk driving case, and therefore that portion of the issue will be omitted.93
92For decisions holding that one cannot insure against punitive damage liability see City Prod. Corp. v.
Globe Indem., 88 Cal.App. 3d 31, 151 Cal.Rptr. 494 (1979); Brown v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 484
P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941);
Perez v. Otero, 415 So.2d 101 (Fla. Distr. Ct. App. 1982); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 IllI.App.3d
1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981); Guar. Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Kan. 532,
618 P.2d 1195 (1980); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Crull v. Gleb, 382
S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537,
342 A.2d 513 (1975); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 422
N.Y.S.2d 47, 397 N.E.2d 737 (1979); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa.Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
For decisions holding that one can insure against punitive damage liability see American Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485,
502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Cedar
Rapids v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1981); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Harrell v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Ore. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977): Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435
(1923); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 241 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d I (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 404 A.2d 101 (1979); Hensley v. Erie Ins.
Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
For a general analysis of the issue of insurability for punitive damages see GHIARDI & KIRCHER, Punitive
Damages Law & Practice, supra note 35 at § 2.03; Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. I (1978); Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976). See
also Comment supra note 14, at 117.
'
3See, e.g. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, England, 56 Cal. App.
3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 (1976) ("The duty to defend... may be broader than the duty to indemnify.");
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 (1966) (holding that the insurer was obligated to de-
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Regarding the indemnity obligation, we shall assume that the insurer is re-
quired to indemnify the insured for liability for the portion of a judgment
assessing compensatory damages, although there is some room for argument
about this point. The problem would arise if the policy contained the rather
typical provision excluding coverage for losses intended by the insured. 4
Depending on how a court characterized what we have been calling "extreme"
conduct, it is conceivable that the conduct would be considered to rise to the
level of "intentional" conduct thereby precluding coverage. The dissent in
Taylor v. Superior Court was concerned with precisely this issue. It stated:
Under the traditional view, an award of punitive damages nullifies all in-
surance coverage. An insurer is not liable for loss intentionally caused by
the insured, and any contract providing for liability is void as being
against public policy [citations omitted]. When an insured commits an in-
tentional injury, he cannot require his insurer to indemnify him for either
punitive or compensatory damages paid under a judgment. [citations
omitted] Because punitive damage is recoverable only for malicious or
other intentional injury [Civ. Code, Sec. 32941, a punitive award tradi-
tionally exonerated the insurance company from coverage.95
The dissent then concluded that permitting the imposition of punitive
damages would cause "the undesirable result that liability insurers will now
avoid all coverage in such cases. While a few victims injured by wealthy drunk
drivers will receive both compensatory and punitive damages, the many unfor-
tunately injured by drivers without assets will be unable to recover even com-
pensatory damages from insurers."96 Given the fact that protection of the in-
jured victim is one of the legitimate, important functions of liability insurance,
it is obvious that we do not want to countenance a practice that would have
the result predicted above. Fortunately, those courts that have ruled on the
issue have not felt compelled to reach that result.
Typical of the reasoning courts generally follow in such cases is the
Fourth Circuit opinion in Pennsylvania T. & F. Mutual Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Thornton.97 In that case, the court stated:
Negligent conduct may be so gross as to merit characterization as willful
and wanton in the sense of the rule for punitive damages, yet fall far short
of an assault and battery which would distinguish it from an accidental
event and withdraw it from the coverage of the policy. 98
fend an assault action notwithstanding policy language excluding coverage for "bodily injury or property
damages caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."); See also, Comment, The Insurer's Duty
to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy 114 U. PA. L. REv. 734 (1966).
'For example, the standard form "Family Combination Automobile Policy" provided by the Insurance In-
formation Institute provides for a liability exclusion for "bodily injury or property damage caused inten-
tionally by or at the direction of the insured."
"'24 Cal.3d at 904, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 702, 598 P.2d at 862.
124 Cal.3d at 905, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 702, 598 P.2d at 862-63.
11244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
"Id. at 827.
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Under the Thornton type rationale, there is then coverage for the compen-
satory portion of the judgment, but what of the punitive portion?
In Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty99 the court
reasoned that to permit insurability would destroy the deterrent value of
punitive damages. The court stated:
If [the defendant] were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance com-
pany, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do
not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages
already have made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing
the insurance company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course,
and considering the extent to which the public is insured, the burden
would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but on the
public, since the added liability to the insurance companies would be
passed along to the premium payers. Society would then be punishing
itself for the wrong committed by the insured." °
Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory and as a deterrent
and accepting as common knowledge the fact that death and injury by
automobile is a problem far from solved by traffic regulation and criminal
prosecutions, it appears to us that there are especially strong public policy
reasons for not allowing socially irresponsible automobile drivers to es-
cape the element of personal punishment in punitive damages when they
are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway .... The de-
linquent driver must not be allowed to receive a windfall at the expense of
the purchasers of insurance, transferring his responsibility for punitive
damages to the very people - the driving public - to whom he is a
menace.
10
'
The opposite position was taken by the court in Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co.'10 The Lazenby decision is as interesting for what
was not said as for what was. The court permitted insurance for punitive
damages on the theory that to prohibit insurability would not deter such
drivers from the wrongful conduct in view of the fact that there are large
numbers of criminal sanctions attached to such behavior already and such
sanctions have little deterrent effect.' 3 In other words, it does not matter
whether one can insure against punitive damages because they do not serve
"307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
'Id. at 440-41.
111d. at 441-42.
102241 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
10 1d. at 642, 383 S.W.2d at 5. The court specifically noted that "[tlhis State, in regard to the proper operation
of motor vehicles, has a great many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently have not deterred this
slaughter on our highways and streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the payment of
punitive damages, would act to deter guilty drivers would in our opinion contain some element of specula-
tion." Id.
Fall, 19841 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
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their intended deterrent function anyway. It would appear that the court is
making an argument against the wisdom of imposing punitive damages in this
type of case, rather than making a case for insurability.""4
Finally, it is necessary to look at the so-called "rate deterrent" argument.
Illustrative of this concept is Price v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany.'05 Briefly, the case arose as follows: Gary Gardner was injured as a result
of a drag race between 17 year old Charles Price and another boy. Gardner
sued Price and the other driver on an extreme misconduct theory. He also
named Price's mother as a defendant on theories of negligent entrustment,
agency, and family purpose. He sought compensatory and punitive damages.
Mrs. Price was the named insured under a Hartford policy with a $1 million
liability limit. Hartford agreed to defend, but advised Mrs. Price that there was
no coverage for any punitive damages which might be assessed. The Prices
then filed an action for declaratory judgment against Hartford. On motion for
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Hartford owed neither defense
nor indemnity obligations to the Prices with regard to the punitive damage
portion of the claim. The basis of the trial court's ruling was that "public policy
of the state of Arizona precludes coverage for [punitive] damages. . . ." ' The
Arizona appellate court agreed that there was no indemnity obligation but
found a defense obligation. The Arizona Supreme Court held that there was
both a defense and indemnity obligation as to the punitive damage portion of
the claim.
The court specifically rejected the McNulty rationale on the basis of a
rate deterrent theory. The court stated: "even though a driver is insured for
punitive damages he cannot engage in wanton conduct with impunity....
Drag racing would subject him to criminal penalties. His insurance rates would
soar."107
This reasoning is interesting though not persuasive. The key to the court's
decision appears to be a rather ambiguous statement that "Hartford has volun-
tarily covered its insured's liability for punitive damages, and since its
premiums were based on its exposure, it may be presumed that holding it liable
for what it promised to pay would not result in additional burdens on the driv-
ing public."'' 8
Apparently, the court believed that Hartford had based its premium struc-
'"See also, Ellis, supra note 14, at 75. Professor Ellis also observes that in the case of Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 228, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 54 (1979),
the court stated that the Lazenby type of argument "essentially addressles] not whether there should be
coverage but whether there should be punitive damages at all." Id. at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d
at 54.
1*0108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
'I*1d. at 486, 502 P.2d at 523.
'
t ld. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524.
'ld.
[Vol. 18:2
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ture on the assumption that it would have to cover punitive damages, and
now, was not going to permit a windfall in the form of reduced coverage. This
would be fair enough if it were not for the fact that, at least in theory,
everyone's premiums should be less if the coverage is restricted.
Furthermore, the court assumes that the young drag racer is going to
maintain $1 million in liability insurance regardless of the higher premium and
would thereby be punished. 109 Also, under Arizona's assigned risk procedure,
Price could have obtained a $15,000/30,000 policy at a rate which may well
not have been truly indicative of the risk which he represented." Perhaps even
more importantly, in those states where insurance is not mandatory, he would
simply drive without insurance.
Thus, the rate deterrent argument only works if the to! tfeasor is required
to insure and if state regulation does not prevent premiums from rising propor-
tionately to the risk presented by the individual insured. Under assigned risk
plans or in states not having mandatory liability insurance, the practical result
of a Price type decision would simply be that there would be many people
unable to afford insurance who would be driving either uninsured or underin-
sured. This is certainly not a result which the court intended. Nor is it a result
which the court should inadvertently permit.
In reading Price, one suspects that the real basis for the decision was that
the court did not believe that punitive damages were a deterrent at all. The
court stated, "there is no evidence that those states which deny coverage have
accomplished any appreciable effect on the slaughter on their highways.""' If,
as one suspects, this is the true basis of the Price decision, it seems more honest
to confront the problem directly.
The other issue that should be mentioned in connection with insurance is
that the possibility of attaining punitive damages creates a potential conflict of
interest for the insurance defense counsel."' This may adversely affect his trial
strategy.
To illustrate the trial strategy problem, assume the case where defense
counsel is confronted with defending a typical rear end collision case where the
defendant had a number of drinks shortly prior to the accident. Discovery
reveals that the plaintiff had come to a complete stop at a red traffic signal and
had been stopped for ten or fifteen seconds when the collision occurred.
"'See, GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 35, at § 2.03, noting that "Itlhe premium increase, if it actually oc-
curs, may never equal in total the amount of money which would have been paid in a lump sum if punitive
damages were not allowed to be covered by insurance."
"'Id. The author noted that "Itlhose who are insured through an assigned risk plan have never paid
premiums at levels which are commensurate with those which would be justified by the claims frequency
and severity of the group." Id
'1108 Ariz. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524.
"'See generally Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies" A Proposed
Solution. i 981 UTAH L. REV. 457.
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Assume further that the plaintiffs injury consisted of purely subjective non-
specific low back pain and that plaintiff's medical records reveal a ten year
history of similar complaints. If the jurisdiction does not permit punitive
damages, defense counsel could and should admit liability and simply try the
issue of damages. By so doing, he could prevent the jury from hearing the
evidence that his client had been drinking since such evidence would be irrele-
vant to the issues tendered (i.e., the nature and extent of the plaintiffs damage,
if any). If, however, the particular jurisdiction permits punitive damages,
defense counsel has no incentive to admit liability and, in fact, would be forced
to vigorously defend on the issue of intoxication.
The potential for defense counsel to be caught in a conflict of interest
arises because, as previously noted, the insurer's defense obligation probably
extends to the entire case even though the indemnity obligation extends only
to the compensatory portion."3 If the case is going to be settled, the insured
may have to contribute. In structuring a settlement, defense counsel is caught
between the insurer (who is paying his fees and probably giving him other
business) and his primary client, the insured. Each, of course, wants the other
to contribute the settlement funds.
B. Fairness Objections
Several other issues arise and cannot be ignored. We begin with the funda-
mental notion that the defendant is entitled to a fair trial regardless of what his
conduct is alleged to have been. Can he receive a fair trial under the circum-
stances which we are discussing here? There are several factors in the civil
drunk driving case which either independently or in combination may preclude
or at least reduce the possibility of a fair trial.
First there is the practical problem that the issue of the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct may become the focal point of the trial overshadowing the
fact that plaintiff's injuries were, in our previous hypothetical, minor or nonex-
istent. As every trial lawyer knows, certain cases have a "punitive" aspect to
them even if punitive damages are not allowable; i.e., the conduct of the defen-
dant is such as to prejudice a jury against him with resultingly exaggerated ver-
dicts. As previously noted, defense counsel might have been able to avoid such
prejudice by admitting liability and just trying the damage issue. This option is
not available, as a practical matter, if punitive damages are recoverable how-
ever. Thus, it may well be that the prejudice to the defendant has become un-
avoidable.
In addition to the highly prejudicial effect of revealing to the jury that a
defendant had been drinking, there is at least one other aspect of the proof of
"'See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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punitive damages which may be so highly prejudicial to the defendant as to vir-
tually eliminate any possibility of a fair trial.
Generally speaking, the amount of punitive damages to be assessed are
within the discretion of the jury. There is no formula or standard means of fix-
ing an amount."4 Virtually all courts however, permit the jury to consider the
wealth of the defendant in assessing an appropriate amount of punitive
damages.
The reason for permitting evidence of wealth has been stated to be "en-
tirely consistent with the notion that punitive damages have a deterrent affect.
Therefore, the greater the personal wealth of the defendant, the greater the
fine necessary to serve as a deterrent."'" 5
It is readily apparent that the prejudicial nature of such evidence may, in
certain cases, be overwhelming."6 One writer observed:
[It] is a good guess that rich men do not fare well before juries, and the
more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare. Such
evidence may do more harm than good; jurymen may be more interested
in divesting vested interests than in attempting to fix penalties which will
make for effective working of the admonitory function."7
'"Frequently courts will state that there should be some corrolation between compensatory and punitive
damages. See, Note, Punitive Damage and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose
9 PAC. L.J. 823 (1978); see also Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1180
(193 1) ("ITlhis test is probably more often a rationalization of results than a means of obtaining them. The
proper ratio between actual damages is placed at a figure which supports the judge's view of the verdict..
Id.).
"'See Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977) ("The rationale employed in
these decisions is that the jury needs to know the extent of the defendant's holdings in order to know how
large an award of damages is necessary to make him smart." See also Note. Evidence - Punitive Damages
- Evidence of Defendant's Financial Condition is Admissible to Determine the Amount of Punitive
Damages to be Awarded Against the Defendant. Hall v. Mntgomery (Iowa 1977). 27 DRAKE L. REV. 584,
586 n. 18 (1977-78) which includes a comprehensive list of the cases in which defendant's wealth was a fac-
tor in assessing the amount of punitive damages; 2nd Freezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Deci-
sion of Certain Types of Tort Cases 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930).
"'See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 822, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 389-90 (1981) (in
which the jury had returned a verdict which included a punitive damage award of $125 million.) It is in-
teresting to note the inconsistent treatment that evidence of the parties' wealth receives from the courts. For
example, in Seimon v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. 67 Cal.App.3d 600, 605-06, 136 Cal.Rptr. 787, 790
(1977) the court chastised plaintiffs counsel for stating to the jury that "I represent the little guy." The court
stated:
It seems clear to us that plaintiffs counsel was deliberately trying to convey an image of himself and
his client as financial underdogs, as 'little guys,' in a court battle against the 'big guy' railroad corpora-
tion. This was clearly improper. Justice is to be accorded to rich and poor alike, and deliberate at-
tempts by counsel to appeal to social or economic prejudices of the jury, including the wealth or
poverty of the litigants, is misconduct where the asserted wealth or poverty is not relevant to the
issues of the case.
Nevertheless, that very case involved a punitive damage issue and, presumably, the wealth of Southern
Pacific Transportation Company was put before the jury. Id.
"'Morris, supra note 114, at 1191. See also, ELLS, supra note 14, at 77, noting that allowing the jury to con-
sider the defendant's wealth causes "Irledistributional tendencies [to bel reinforced, biases countenanced,
and disproportional punishments encouraged."
PUNITIVE DAMAGESFall, 19841
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The question of comparative fault is a further issue which needs to be ad-
dressed. To illustrate the problem, let us imagine a typical right angle intersec-
tion controlled in all directions by stop signs. The plaintiff, a teetotaler ap-
proaches the intersection at the posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour.
Unfortunately, he is thinking of what he plans to do that evening, or the day at
the office or something other than his driving and therefore fails to observe
either the stop sign or the defendant who is approaching the intersection at the
same speed. The defendant is also inattentive. However, he has also consumed
enough alcohol to be legally intoxicated. The two vehicles collide in the center
of the intersection and both plaintiff and defendant sustain identical damages.
Were it not for the fact the defendant had been drinking, it is clear that we
would expect a 50-50 liability split and a particular result depending on
whether the jurisdiction has adopted comparative negligence and, if so, what
form.
But, if the court focuses on the fact of the defendant's drinking rather
than on the totality of his behavior, the possibility of an anomalous result ex-
ists. First, if the defendant's behavior is considered grounds for punitive
damages (i.e., is considered some form of "extreme" behavior) and is thus
somehow more than negligent, is the plaintiffs negligence a defense?"' Second,
in a jurisdiction similar to California a plaintiff can recover punitive damages
against the defendant even though, for all intents and purposes, their conduct
contributed equally to the happening of the accident.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having thus noted some objections to and the shortcomings of the civil
punishment system, let us return to the basic question involved. Is there any
place for the imposition of punitive damages for the unintentional tort and, if
so, under what circumstances and with which limitations, qualifications and
exceptions should they be imposed. To answer those questions let us again ex-
amine the possibilities established earlier. Courts could and some do, focus
primarily on the totality of the defendant's conduct to prove state of mind. In
such a case, the issue of punitive damages could not be submitted to the jury
until such time as the judge has made a preliminary determination that the
"'Attempts to analyze degrees of misconduct in this context results in the same confusion of language which
was noted earlier. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, TORTS § 64, 436-37 (3d ed. 1964). Prosser states:
The ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff is to be set over against the ordinary negligence
of the defendant, to bar the action. But where the defendants' conduct is actually intended to inflict
harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the
defense has never been extended to such intentional torts. Thus it is no defense to assault and battery.
The same is true of that aggravated form of negligence, approaching intent, which has been
characterized variously as 'wilful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless,' as to which all courts have held that or-
dinary negligence of the plaintiff will not bar recovery.... Thus if the defendants' negligence is mere-
ly 'gross,' an extreme departure from ordinary standards but still without elements of 'willfulness' or
'wantonness,' it is generally held that if plaintiff's own conduct is 'wilful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless,' it will
be balanced against similar conduct on the part of the defendant and recognized as a bar to his action.
[Vol. 18:2
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conduct of the defendant was so extreme so as to pose an extraordinarily high
risk of harm to the foreseeable plaintiffs. Having made that determination, the
intoxicant use by defendant would be one of the factors tending to prove the
extreme state of mind, a finding of which being a prerequisite to the imposition
of punitive damages.
The other possibility is to focus solely on the drinking conduct of the
defendant. If this approach is adopted, the drinking itself becomes the conduct
to be punished regardless of whether it can be demonstrated in a particular
case to be a factor in defendant's negligent conduct. That is to say, the volun-
tary consumption of alcohol conclusively establishes the extreme state of mind
necessary to impose punitive damages.
The weakness in the second approach is that it is overinclusive. It extends
punitive damages to the case, which on its face, is nothing more than momen-
tary inattention or distraction. In her concurring opinion in Taylor v. Superior
Court, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird neatly defined the
overinclusive nature of the majority position:
The majority allow a complaint for punitive damages to be pursued on the
mere allegation that an accident occurred and the driver had taken
enough wine at dinner to be classified as legally under the influence of
alcohol and knew that he would have to drive home. This behavior may
be reckless but it is not malicious
Malice has been held to be present where a person acted with knowledge
that harm to others was substantially certain or at least highly probable
(citations). However, to take this idea and expand it to include a cir-
cumstance where injury to others is not certain is unwise. Persons who
drive while under the influence often lack a conscious appreciation of the
high risk of harm they may present to others. In contrast, in the products
liability area, a person who widely markets a dangerous drug without the
proper warnings is aware that injury will probably result from his acts or
omissions (citations). The decision to drive after having taken a few drinks
ordinarily does not rise to a comparable level of conscious indifference to
the safety of others."9
However, even if we reject the California approach as being overin-
clusive, we are not required to adopt the alternative. The question of justi-
fication for punitive damages for drunk driving remains. When in Part I11, we
discussed rationales for punitive damages, the only justification which lacked
the substantial weakness present in all other suggestions was that punitive
damages might be useful in deterring noncompulsive recidivist behavior.
"124 Cal.3d at 900-901, 598 P.2d at 859-60, 157 CaI.Rptr. at 699-700 jBird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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The rationale of using punitive damages to deter persons other than the
defendant (i.e., general deterrence) cannot possibly work unless and until the
existence of punitive damages in the drunk driving case becomes a matter of
common knowledge. The retribution rationale also failed both under the
classic theory and as being a questionable goal for any legal system. Further-
more, if we are to have retribution as a goal at all, it seems clear that it is a mat-
ter better left to the criminal courts. Special deterrence, i.e., deterrence of a
particular individual from repeating undesirable conduct may however be
justifiable. The "lack of public awareness" problem inherent in the general
deterrence possibility can be eliminated provided that punitive damages are
not available against a first offender. Under such circumstances, at the time of
an initial drunk driving offense, the defendant would be advised that punitive
damages would be available the second time around. Having thus been
forewarned, he could hardly be heard to complain should he be foolish enough
to again engage in such extreme conduct.
It probably goes without saying, however, that nothing is to be gained by
applying this rationale to the person who is truly incapable of molding his con-
duct to social expectations. Therefore, it should be a defense to the punitive
damage portion of the case that the defendant's conduct was a result of illness
and therefore he did not exhibit the requisite state of mind.
In her concurring opinion in Taylor v. Superior Court California Chief
Justice Bird indicated that on the facts of that particular case punitive damages
might be justifiable on the basis indicated here. She stated:
[lin this particular case the defendant is charged with repeatedly driving
while intoxicated after his own experience has made him completely
aware of the possible consequences of his act. Therefore, in this particular
case it may be possible for a jury to conclude "the second time was no ac-
cident."'20
It is also interesting to note that what is being recommended here bears
some striking similarities to Professor Hall's recommendation regarding intox-
ication as a defense in the criminal law. 2' Professor Hall argues for exculpating
extremely intoxicated persons "unless at the time of sobriety and voluntary
drinking they had such prior experience as to anticipate their intoxication and
that they would become dangerous in that condition."'22 While the criminal
law has not adopted Professor Hall's position, it seems entirely appropriate to
adopt some variation of his proposed standard in determining the propriety of
imposing the quasi criminal remedy.
"'Id. at 901, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 CaI.Rptr. at 700.
1J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 556 (2d ed. 1960).
122Id.
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